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Abstract
In recent years, there has been a virtual explosion of interest in corporate go
ernance. Corporate scandals and the need to protect minority shareholders’ interests are two
of the reasons behind the development of corporate governance codes in numerous countries
and corporations. At the same time, the concepts of “sustainable development”, “corporate
responsibility”, and “corporate citizenship” have taken root in the business world. Although
corporate governance and sustainable development have been extensively researched as
separate fields of inquiry, less attention has been paid to the interaction between the two. This
paper attempts to bridge this gap by examining how corporate governance systems are
evolving so as to take account of sustainable development thinking. We analyze the
governance systems of the leading companies in the 18 market sectors included in the Dow
Jones Sustainability World Index (DJSWI). We present the results of our in-depth analysis of
the 18 cases and propose the Sustainable Corporate Governance Model that emerges from
that analysis.
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Introduction1
In recent years, there has been a virtual explosion of interest in corporate
governance. Corporate scandals and the need to protect minority shareholders’ interests are
two of the reasons behind the development of corporate governance codes in numerous
countries and corporations. Most corporate governance codes contain recommendations
intended to foster good corporate governance and increase transparency and disclosure
(Mallin, 2002). At the same time, the concepts of “sustainable development”, “corporate
responsibility”, and “corporate citizenship” have taken root in the business world. Although
corporate governance and sustainable development have been extensively researched as
separate fields of inquiry, less attention has been paid to the interaction between the two.
This paper attempts to bridge that gap by examining how corporate governance systems are
evolving so as to take account of sustainable development thinking. We analyze the
governance systems of the leading corporations in the market sectors included in the Dow
Jones Sustainability World Index (DJSWI). The objectives of this paper are twofold: to
analyze in depth how and to what extent DJSWI leaders have integrated sustainability into
their corporate governance systems; and to develop a model for sustainable corporate
governance based on corporate governance and sustainable development theories, and built
on empirical research into the corporate governance systems of leading DJSWI companies.
We start the paper by reviewing the literature on corporate governance systems –
agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983), legalistic perspective
(Williamson, 1964; Berle and Means, 1968; Mace, 1971), resource dependence (Pfeffer,
1972; 1973), class hegemony (Mills, 1956; Domhoff, 1969), the integrative work of Zahra
and Pearce (1989), and the more recent studies by Johnson, Daily and Ellstrand (1996),
Daily (1996), and Daily et al. (2003). Our goal was to identify the elements of governance
systems that are key determinants of firm performance. In order to integrate the
sustainability dimension into our research framework, we also consider the most important
insights on corporate governance systems from stakeholder and sustainable development
theories (Freeman, 1984; Gladwin, Kennelly and Krause, 1995; Bansal and Roth, 2000).
Drawing from the aforementioned literature streams, we identify the issues that we should
consider in our in-depth research into the governance systems of DJSWI leaders. Next,
we describe the research design and methods used for the study. This is followed by a
discussion of the results of our analysis of the corporate governance systems of DJSWI
1 This paper is part of a research project of the Center for Business in Society and the Center for
Globalization at IESE financed by the BBVA Foundation. We would like to acknowledge the collaboration
of Sustainability Asset Management (SAM). It has been instrumental in the success of the project.leading companies. In this discussion, we explain the most noteworthy practices (from a
sustainability point of view) that we have observed in the governance systems of the
companies in our sample and we present the Model of Sustainable Corporate Governance
that emerges from our benchmark study. We conclude by pointing out the limitations of our
research and discussing the implications for researchers and practitioners.
Theory
Corporate governance systems
The literature on corporate governance systems follows four main approaches –
agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983), the legalistic
perspective (Williamson, 1964; Berle and Means, 1968; Mace, 1971; Budnitz, 1990;
Bainbridge, 1993; Miller, 1993; Cieri, Sullivan and Lennox, 1994), resource dependence
(Pfeffer, 1972; 1973), and class hegemony (Mills, 1956; Domhoff, 1969). The theoretical
origins of these four approaches are, respectively, economics and finance, corporate law,
organizational theory and sociology, and Marxist sociology. Agency theory views the
modern corporation as a nexus of contracts between principals and agents (Aguilera and
Jackson, 2003) and has contributed valuable insights into many aspects of the manager-
shareholder relationship (Daily et al., 2003), and thus into the role of Boards of Directors
(c.f., Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The legalistic perspective considers that Boards
contribute to their firms’ performance by fulfilling their legally mandated responsibilities,
that is to say, corporate leadership without actual interference in day-to-day operations (c.f.,
Williamson, 1964). The resource dependence perspective views Boards as important
boundary spanners that provide information to executives and are able to obtain resources
for company operations (c.f., Pfeffer, 1973). Finally, the class hegemony perspective views
Boards as a means of perpetuating the power of the ruling capitalist elite and its control of
social and economic institutions (c.f., Mills, 1956). 
Two issues that the aforementioned perspectives have addressed are the roles that
Boards of Directors have to fulfill, and the attributes Boards must have in order to
contribute to firm performance. In Table 1 we summarize the attributes and roles considered
by the four perspectives (Zahra and Pearce, 1989; Johnson et al., 1996; Daily et al., 2003).
Table 1. Attributes and roles of Boards of directors
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Perspectives
Legalistic, resource dependence, class hegemony, agency theory
Legalistic, resource dependence, class hegemony, agency theory
Legalistic, agency theory
Legalistic, class hegemony, agency theory
Legalistic, resource dependence, class hegemony, agency theory
Legalistic, resource dependence, class hegemony, agency theory
Resource dependence










– StrategyBoard composition refers to size (number of directors), director types (executive
and non-executive directors), and minority representation (ethnic minorities and females)
(Hillman, Cannella and Paetzol, 2000). Board characteristics has two basic components –
directors’ background (age, educational background, values, and experience) and Board
personality (Zahra and Pearce, 1989). Board structure refers to the dimensions of
the Board’s organization, covering the number and types of committees, committee
membership, and the flow of information among those committees, and Board leadership
(Zahra and Pearce, 1989). Board process refers to the approach the Board takes in making
its decisions, including the frequency and length of meetings, the CEO-Board interface, the
formality of Board proceedings, and the extent to which the Board is involved in evaluating
itself (Mueller, 1979; Vance, 1983). Strategy role refers to the Board’s essential contribution
in formulating strategy and monitoring its effective implementation (Baysinger and Butler,
1985; Kosnik, 1987). Service role involves enhancing company reputation, establishing
contacts with the external environment, and giving counsel and advice to executives
(Carpenter, 1988; Louden, 1982; Pfeffer, 1972). Control role refers to the Board’s task of
assessing firm performance, evaluating the CEO, and defining executive compensation
policies (Brindisi, 1989; Brossy, 1986). Resource role implies a view of the Board as a
means of facilitating the acquisition of resources that are critical to the firm’s success
(Pfeffer, 1972; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).
Sustainable development and stakeholder theories
Although, as we have just seen, corporate governance has been studied in the
literature from different perspectives, agency theory plays a pivotal role. While producing
valuable insights into many aspects of the manager-shareholder conflict, agency theory has
overlooked important interdependencies among other stakeholders of the firm (Aguilera and
Jackson, 2003). Thus, this dominant approach has impeded a deeper analysis of new
idiosyncratic relationships of today’s firms. 
Stakeholder theory posits that the capacity of a firm to generate sustainable wealth
over time, and hence its long-term value, is determined by its relationships with critical
stakeholders (e.g., Carroll, 1989; Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Freeman, 1984; Jones,
1995; Jones and Wicks, 1999; Mitchell, Agle and Wood, 1997; Post, Preston and Sachs,
2002). In this theory, the corporation is defined as a socio-economic organization built to
create wealth for its multiple constituencies. The stakeholders2 of any firm are usually quite
diverse, but relationships between the firm and each of its stakeholders have many common
features; in addition, the stakeholders have common interests (as well as potentially
conflicting interests) (Mitchell et al., 1997). 
According to this view, the critical challenge for contemporary management is to
recognize the mutual interests among the firm and its stakeholders. Following this argument,
Jones and Hill (1992) developed a ‘stakeholder agency’ model and argued that managers
should act as ‘agents’ for stakeholders (the relevant ‘principals’). However, the multiple-
valued objective implicit in stakeholder theory has led to much controversy and criticism
(Jensen, 2000). Jensen considers that, if widely adopted, stakeholder theory will reduce
social welfare because it increases agency costs in economic systems. Surprisingly, in the
same article, Jensen asserts that “we cannot maximize the long-term market value of an
organization if we ignore or mistreat any important constituency” (ibid: 50). 
3
2 Post, Preston and Sachs (2002: 8) propose the following definition of stakeholders: “The stakeholders in a
firm are individuals and constituencies that contribute, either voluntarily or involuntarily, to its wealth-
creating capacity and activities, and who are therefore its potential beneficiaries and/or risk bearers.”Building upon these previously discussed research streams, our approach to
stakeholder theory is both normative and instrumental. The first argument is rooted in the
idea that through business activities –and responsible business leaders– individual welfare
and society in general can be improved. Thus, assuming that corporations have a critical role
and responsibility in social development, stakeholders have a legitimate interest in
procedural and/or substantive aspects of corporate activity (Donaldson and Preston, 1995).
Second, engaging with stakeholders through dialogue can be a way of obtaining legitimacy
or a “license to operate”, as well as a way of gaining strategic sources of sustainable
competitive advantage, such as trust, reputation and innovation (Jones, 1995; Rodríguez,
Ricart and Sánchez, 2002), or of generating disruptive business models and innovations
(Hart and Sharma, 2004). 
The concept of sustainable development has received a wide range of definitions.
Gladwin, Kennelly, and Krause (1995) propose a definition that includes the principal
components of the ideas shared by a majority of the definitions. In their view, “sustainable
development is a process of achieving human development […] in an inclusive, connected,
equitable, prudent, and secure manner. Inclusiveness implies human development over
time and space. Connectivity entails an embrace of ecological, social, and economic
interdependence.  Equity suggests intergenerational, intra-generational, and interspecies
fairness. Prudence connotes duties of care and prevention: technologically, scientifically,
and politically. Security demands safety from chronic threats and protection from harmful
disruption” (p. 878).
In the management field, sustainable development theory has attempted to broadly
redefine the global societal role of the business corporation (Gladwin, Kennelly, and Krause,
1995; Hart, 1997; Sharma, Vredenburg, and Westley, 1994; Shrivastava, 1995; Starik and
Rands, 1995; Westley and Vredenburg, 1996). Researchers have proposed that our future
lies in building sustainable enterprises and an economic reality that connects industry,
society, and the environment (Hart, 1997; Senge and Carstedt, 2001). According to
Elkington (1997), the firm’s ultimate objective is not singular (create value for its
shareholders) but rather threefold (create economic, ecological, and social value). Therefore,
the central value of the sustainable firm is not economic growth but sustainable
development. In other words, to succeed in this endeavor it is essential to develop business
models and products that work financially, in addition to being socially, ecologically, and
ethically correct. Another stream of literature has sought to demonstrate how firms may gain
competitive advantage from sustainability strategies through efficiency cost savings, and
product stewardship (Hart and Ahuja, 1996; Porter and van der Linde, 1995; Shrivastava,
1995), acquisition of strategic resources and capabilities (Hart, 1995; Rodríguez, Ricart
and Sánchez, 2002), and development of learning and dynamic capabilities (Hart and
Sharma, 2004).
Following these theories and thoughts, we base our research into the corporate
governance practices of DJSWI leading companies on two basic assumptions regarding the
path towards sustainable development. First, firms must change their values, strategies and
businesses models in order to embed sustainable development dimensions. Second, firms
must open their boundaries by establishing a fluid, honest, and transparent dialogue with
their stakeholders.
4Methodology
Given the relatively new and unexplored nature of the phenomenon –how and to
what extent leading companies are embedding sustainability in their governance systems– in
this study we adopted an inductive research strategy (Eisenhardt, 1989, Yin, 1984) based on
qualitative research techniques (Miles and Huberman, 1984). Qualitative research, as
opposed to traditional quantitative empirical tools, is particularly useful for exploring
implicit assumptions and examining new relationships, abstract concepts, and operational
definitions (Weick, 1996; Bettis, 1991). The aim was to conduct an analysis of firms that are
leading the sustainability process in order to see how, in practice, sustainable development is
affecting and changing corporate governance systems. Rather than conduct a statistical
study to find out the ‘average’, we wanted to see if there is a trend towards sustainable
corporate governance, and also develop constructs that will facilitate future hypothesis
testing (Eisenhardt, 1989). Thus, companies were not selected randomly. Rather, they were
chosen because they were recognized as sustainability leaders by the most renowned
sustainability index, the Dow Jones Sustainability World Indexes (DJSI World). DJSI World
includes more than 300 companies, representing the top 10% –the sustainability leaders–
among the 2,500 largest companies in the Dow Jones Global Indexes, covering 59 industry
groups in 34 countries. This sample covers different geographical areas (Australia, Europe,
Japan, and North America) and a wide array of industries, offering a rich diversity of
corporate cultures.
The identification of sustainability leaders for the Dow Jones Sustainability Indexes
is based on the corporate sustainability assessment conducted by Sustainability Asset
Management (SAM) Research, which evaluates opportunities and risks for the eligible
companies based on economic, environmental, and social developments. After this process,
SAM Research identifies the companies with the highest sustainability performance score
for each market sector in the Dow Jones classification. Finally, a group of 18 companies
constitutes the market sector leaders3. This process is reviewed annually. Those eighteen
companies are the sample for our exploratory study.
The literature review on corporate governance systems and sustainable
development and stakeholder theories allowed us to obtain the initial research questions
through which to explore the corporate governance practices of the DJSWI leading
companies. These research questions provided guidance for this study and allowed us to
concentrate on identifying “meaningful events” or activities (Yin, 1981). Specifically, we
focused our research on the embedding of sustainability and stakeholder openness values in
the attributes (composition, characteristics, structure and process) and roles (control,
service, resource and strategy) of the sample companies’ corporate governance systems. The
research was conducted over a period of one year and involved triangulation among a
variety of data sources (Yin, 1984), including corporate web pages and public reports,
answers to customized questionnaires sent to companies, and additional information
gathered with the collaboration of Sustainability Asset Management (SAM) Research
Division. Qualitative studies such as this have provided critical insights into a variety of
phenomena, such as innovation (Galunic and Eisenhardt, 2001), entrepreneurship (Miner
et al., 2001), alliances (Larson, 1992), social issues (Dutton and Dukerich, 1991),
organizational change (Smith and Zeithaml, 1996; Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997), and
proactive responsiveness to environmental uncertainty (Sharma and Vredenburg, 1998).
5
3 The sample is composed of the following companies: 3M, British Telecom, CRH, Dofasco, DuPont, Lend
Lease, Intel, Marks & Spencer, Novozymes, Pearson, Procter & Gamble, Severn Trent, Shell, Swiss Re,
Teijin, Unilever, Volkswagen, and Westpac Banking.Data collection involved several overlapping steps (Yin, 1984). Beginning in 2002,
two MBA students and two research assistants conducted an exhaustive search for
information on corporate governance, using publicly available sources, namely Internet web
sites and company reports. Next, a questionnaire was prepared and sent to all the
corporations in the sample. The response rate was 62.5%. We also relied on the valuable
collaboration of SAM for completing this process and obtaining the remaining information.
SAM’s information also allowed us to compare some results with a wider sample of almost
800 companies. This comparative analysis was especially useful for identifying emerging
practices. The information gathered from public sources was then compared and contrasted
with the results from the questionnaires and the SAM information in an exploratory fashion
to enhance ‘generalizability’ (Miles and Huberman, 1984). 
Results
Analysis of the corporate governance systems of DJSI leading companies pointed
to important results that we discuss below and led to the proposal of the Sustainable
Corporate Governance Model.
Values
Individuals in firms have bounded rationality, cognitive biases, and personal values
that direct their actions (Cyert & March, 1963; Hambrick & Mason, 1984; March & Simon,
1958). When fully experienced, shared values lie at the core of a firm’s culture and make it
possible to successfully and safely decentralize the decision-making process. Values reflect
beliefs about what is truly important. For this reason, the acceptance of values tightly
coupled with the principles of sustainable development is essential for achieving real
progress towards a sustainable organization.
According to the conceptual foundations of sustainable development and
stakeholder theories, the underlying value of a sustainable enterprise is to endure and
understand that its ability to endure depends on its contribution to the endurance of its
physical and social environment. Therefore, we analyzed to what extent the values included
in the sample companies’ value statements were coherent with that underlying value.
Although the companies in our sample tend to give different names to these values, we have
used what we consider to be the most standard terms as a way to obtain meaningful results
in our research. In Table 2, we present the results.















10As we can see, ‘responsibility’ and ‘sustainability’ are the most accepted core
values, with 12 companies embracing them, followed by ‘integrity’, with 11. The values
‘dialogue with stakeholders’ and ‘diversity’ also have a wide acceptance, with 8 companies
adopting them. Interestingly, we see that 10 of the DJSWI leading companies consider
innovation to be a core value. This may be interpreted as a sign of the importance of
innovation for remaining competitive, but we can also infer that innovation can be
considered as a driver of sustainability.
Board composition and characteristics
Composition and characteristics are closely related attributes. The resource
dependence perspective has emphasized the relevance of these attributes because it
considers Boards as important boundary spanners that provide essential resources, or secure
those resources through linkages to the external environment. Furthermore, because of their
prestige in their communities and professions, directors help to enhance the firm’s
legitimacy in society (Boyd, 1990; Pfeffer, 1972, 1973; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Price,
1963; Provan, 1980). Some authors have seen a positive relationship between Board
composition (e.g., ratio of insiders to outsiders, or proportion of female and minority
Board members) and acts of social responsibility (Zahra & Stanton, 1988) or corporate
philanthropy (Wang & Coffey, 1992), while others have observed that firms strategically
alter Board composition in order to respond to significant changes in their external
environment (Hillman et al., 2000). 
Board members should have the skills, experience and capabilities required for
exercising their specific responsibilities as effectively as possible. We might therefore
expect leading sustainability companies to have in their boardrooms members and
executives who are capable of providing essential new viewpoints and expertise on
sustainable development topics. At the same time, given the novelty of the CR/SD4 field, we
wanted to find out if Board directors receive some kind of induction training to improve
their understanding of the implications of sustainable development for the firm. 
Our results show that 13 Boards are adequately conversant with and aware of
sustainable development issues. However, only 4 companies have formal CR training
programs for their directors. Table 3 shows the results for Board composition and
characteristics.
Table 3. Composition and characteristics of the Board
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4 Throughout the article we use the terms “corporate responsibility” and “sustainable development” and their
abbreviations CR and SD interchangeably.
One or more directors
knowledgeable about SD








KnownThe cases of DuPont and Dofasco help to show the strong commitment and
experience of Board members in the field of sustainable development. 
The DuPont Board has thirteen members, five of whom have a relevant track record
in the field of corporate responsibility or sustainable development. To mention just one,
Chad Holliday, CEO and Chairman, is a promoter of sustainable development within his
company. He has written the article “Sustainable Growth, the DuPont Way”, published in
Harvard Business Review, and co-authored the book ‘Walking the Talk: The Business Case
for Sustainable Development’.
The Dofasco company is a Founding Sponsor of the Sustainable Enterprise
Academy (SEA) at the Schulich School of Business at York University (Canada). The SEA’s
mission is to provide senior executives with the vision, education, tools and support to
champion sustainable development in their organizations. Dofasco President and CEO John
Mayberry, as well as other Dofasco senior executives, completed the program in 2001. The
Dean of the Schulich School of Business has been a member of Dofasco’s Board of
Directors since 1985. He has supported the creation of the Sustainability Enterprise
Academy. 
Board Structure
Board structure refers to the dimensions of the Board’s organization. It covers the
number and types of committees, committee membership, the flow of information among
those committees, and Board leadership. In order to protect shareholders’ rights, agency
theory researchers have recommended creating compensation and appointment committees,
audit committees, and shareholder relations committees (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; Jensen &
Meckling, 1976). These committees should be chaired by outside directors to ensure real
and effective supervision (Davis, Schoorman & Donaldson, 1997). The setting-up of Board
committees –remuneration committee, audit committee, appointments committee, and so
on– has permitted Boards of Directors to deal more specifically with relevant issues
affecting the corporation. In view of the implications of sustainable development for the
firm, it might seem reasonable that the firm’s top corporate governance body should have a
committee, led by one of its members, to promote, supervise and assess the incorporation of
sustainability criteria into the firm’s strategy and operation, and into the activities of the
Board itself.
We  reviewed the Board structures of the DJSI market sector leaders, looking for
Board committees with formal responsibilities in CR or similar (henceforth CR
committees). We distinguished between CR committees with only non-executive members,
and committees with both executive and non-executive members. Our results show that 10
companies have already appointed a CR committee to integrate sustainable development
topics into their strategy and operations. There are more Board committees with only non-
executive members than with executive and non-executive members, although the difference
is not significant. We also observed that the firm’s CEO is always present in CR committees
made up of executive and non-executive members. 
Whereas we can find as many names for CR committees as there are companies in
the sample, in practice most of the committees have similar responsibilities. Summarizing,
those responsibilities are the following: 
8• Consider, review, evaluate and monitor environmental, social and ethical
policies. 
• In collaboration with top management, ensure that strategy takes sustainable
development dimensions into account.
• Advise the Board on SD/CR policies.
Among companies without a CR committee, we identified two systems that allow
the Board of Directors to track the company’s progress towards sustainability:
• Five companies integrate sustainability issues and CR policies in existing Board
or top management committees. In this case, some of these committees assume
new responsibilities in relation to sustainable development.
•T wo companies have appointed one director of the Board with specific
responsibilities for reviewing and monitoring environmental, social and ethical
policies.
Considering all the different types of corporate governance structures and systems
mentioned above, we can say that all companies except one have some type of governance
structure that allows the Board of Directors to review, supervise and assess the firm’s ‘triple
bottom line’. Table 4 shows these results. 
Table 4. Structure of the Board for integrating sustainability into strategy
9

































1As we will see later, the structure of the Board is a key factor for ensuring the
integration of sustainable development into the firm’s strategy. The creation of CR
committees or the assumption of sustainable development responsibilities by existing
committees provides a strong mechanism to strengthen sustainability strategy. As a
matter of fact, comparing the DJSI leaders with all the companies analyzed by SAM
(approximately 800 companies), we find that the biggest difference lies precisely in the
appointment of CR committees (see Graph 1). While 83% of DJSI leaders have appointed a
CR committee5, only 21% of the universe of firms analyzed by SAM has formalized
sustainable development responsibilities within a Board committee. Thus, adapting Board
structure to sustainability requirements turns out to be a fundamental factor for ensuring a
better quality and depth of overall formulation and implementation of sustainability strategy. 
Graph 1. Appointment of Board committees
Source: SAM Research.
Furthermore, Graph 1 shows that DJSI leading companies invariably have better
governance structures for dealing with typical Board responsibilities than ordinary
companies. Corporate governance reports and codes –e.g., Winter report (EU), Higgs report
(UK), Aldama report (Spain), Cromme code (Germany)– always recommend the
appointment of specific committees to undertake some of the Board’s key responsibilities,
such as selection, appointment and compensation of key executives, audit, and
information disclosure. In Graph 1, we can observe how DJSI leading companies follow
these recommendations on corporate governance more closely than ordinary companies. We
would like to insist, however, that, although these differences in the degree of fulfillment of
good corporate governance codes can be considerable, the most important and noteworthy
10
5 This percentage comes from the sum of those DJSI leading companies that have a specific CR Board
committee and those that have integrated CR policies and responsibility within an existing Board committee.
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General sampledifference resides in the appointment of CR committees. From these results we can conclude
that sustainability is a key component of good corporate governance.
A good example is Westpac Banking of Australia, which has established a complete
governance structure to fully integrate corporate responsibility into the way it does business.
In 2001, the Board set up a Board Social Responsibility Committee to reinforce the firm’s
commitment to sustainable and socially responsible practices. Westpac’s corporate social
responsibility governance system is a hierarchical structure segmented into four layers (from
top to bottom): the Board and the Board Social Responsibility Committee, which overlaps
with Executive Office CSR business review (comprising the Chief Executive Officer and
CSR management), which overlaps with the Customer Committee, the Environmental
Advisory Group and Stakeholder Engagement. This then leads into a two-way relationship
with the final layer, business units (see Figure 1).
Figure 1. Westpac Banking CR Governance Structure
The Board is responsible, among other things, for ensuring that business is
conducted ethically and transparently, setting standards for social and ethical practices, and
monitoring compliance with Westpac’s social responsibilities and practices. The principle
purpose of the Board Social Responsibility Committee is to foster Westpac’s commitment to
operate its business in a manner consistent with the rapidly changing demands of society.
The Social Responsibility Committee reviews the social and ethical impacts of Westpac’s
policies and practices and oversees initiatives to enhance Westpac’s reputation as a socially
responsible corporate citizen. It also participates with management in setting the strategic
direction for Westpac’s image, including social and environmental policy, community
involvement, and ethical policy relating to lending and investment activities. The Social
Responsibility Committee is made up of three non-executive Board members plus one
executive Board member, who is the CEO. According to Westpac’s Senior Advisor on
Corporate Responsibility and Sustainability, typical agenda items of the Board of Social
11
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Business unitsResponsibility include: sustainable supply chain management; feedback from external
assessments and ratings; performance measured against social and environmental indicators;
external sustainability reporting; new customer satisfaction measures; and review of
initiatives for Indigenous Australians.
Board Process
Board operations –such as the selection of agenda items for Board meetings, Board
materials distributed in advance, Board access to independent advisors, establishment of
directors’ responsibilities, and so on– are working procedures that determine how the
processes of information generation and sharing, decision-making and accountability, and
distribution of resources and wealth are carried out. Because most of the aspects of
sustainable development are quite new for most companies, it seems advisable for their top
corporate governance bodies to regularly consider and prioritize these issues and foster good
practices in their boardrooms. Thus, discussion of sustainable development and its
implications for the firm should become routine for the Boards of Directors of companies
that have adopted sustainability as a core value and business driver. 
We observed the communication and working processes most commonly used for
dealing with sustainability in the sample firms’ governance structure. We focused our
analysis on the frequency of Board meetings at which sustainable development topics were
discussed, the communication mechanisms between the Board and CR committees, and the
practice of inviting external experts on CR or sustainable development to Board meetings. 
Our results show that the frequency of meetings at which sustainability policies are
formally discussed varies from once to four times a year (see Table 5). We should also
mention that most companies state that sustainability is informally discussed at many, if not
all, Board meetings because sustainable development is integrated into the way they do
business and is at the core of the firm’s strategy. The agenda for each meeting is normally
finalized one month before the meeting, and information, whether related to sustainability or
not, is distributed one or two weeks in advance, with one week being the standard.
Nevertheless, sensitive matters or urgent issues may be discussed at the meeting without
written materials being distributed either in advance or at the meeting.











Three times a year
Four times a year
Not Known
Number of Board meetings in which
sustainability strategy
and policies are formally discussedRegarding Board CR committees, we observed that the frequency of meetings
varies from two to four times a year. After each meeting, the committee reports to the Board
on its activities and decisions. Furthermore, as some or all of the CR Committee’s members
are also Board members, communication is secured through membership of both bodies.
Other common communication mechanisms to inform the Board of sustainability issues are:
periodic updates to directors on all matters, including sustainability, and regular reports to
directors on CR from internal executive committees. 
For instance, Marks & Spencer’s CR Committee meets at least three times
annually. In addition, there are bi-monthly updates to all Board members on CR and the
environment. The CR Committee receives relevant papers at least a week prior to the
meeting, which is the norm for all M&S Board level meetings. The main Board has special
responsibility for environmental and external stakeholder policies. One Board member has
specific responsibility for environmental issues, and internal sustainable development
experts (assisted by external expertise as required) feed in to the CR Committee at every
meeting.
Finally, in none of the companies analyzed is there a formal policy of inviting
external sustainable development experts to Board meetings. However, based on the
responses from the companies we contacted, we found that most of them do actually invite
external experts when they consider it appropriate. That means, for instance, that external
guests are invited from time to time to talk to the Board about topics affecting the
corporation (e.g., global warming, biotechnology, etc.) or to advise the Board on sustainable
management policies and tools.
Board’s resource role
As we explained above, the resource dependence perspective on corporate
governance underlines the importance of the Board and its members in ensuring that the
firm obtains the necessary resources, through their linkages to the external environment. As
we indicated in the literature review, in stakeholder theory the corporation is defined as a
socio-economic organization built to create wealth for its multiple constituencies. In Graph
2 we can see the answers provided by DJSI leaders and ordinary companies to the question
“To what extent do these stakeholders influence the firm’s decisions?”
The first conclusion that we can draw from Graph 2 is that DJSI sector leaders are
clearly more ‘stakeholder-oriented’ than ordinary companies. In all cases, at least 50% of
DJSI sector leaders consider the different stakeholder groups important for their businesses.
For ordinary companies, on the other hand, only shareholders go beyond this percentage.
These results confirm that traditional companies still see shareholders as the main
stakeholders and other groups as less relevant. Shareholders are considered to be the most
important stakeholder for both groups, with 100% for DJSI sector leaders and 65% for
ordinary companies. However, DJSI sector leaders consider other stakeholders as being
almost equally important, such as local communities, with 94%, and governments, with
83%. In the case of ordinary companies the percentages are reduced by half. Suppliers and
trade unions also have a remarkable result in the case of DJSI sector leaders, with 61% of
the companies recognizing them as a relevant group. Finally, NGOs, interest groups, and the
media are the groups least involved in any form of stakeholder dialogue. Nevertheless, half
of the DJSI sector leaders already regularly involve these groups in stakeholder dialogue
activities.
13Graph 2. Importance of stakeholder groups1
–––––––––––––––––––
1 The customer group is missing from these results. However, our analysis of DJSI sector leaders shows that
100% of these companies recognize customers as a relevant group. We can assume that this percentage
would also be close to 100% for ordinary companies.
Source: SAM Research.
Dialogue mechanisms are activities that allow the firm to interact with its
stakeholders. Our research found that stakeholder dialogue is a common practice among
DJSI sector leaders. Mechanisms such as stakeholder panels, meetings with local
communities, forums with employees or suppliers, and internet and intranet communication
tools are just a small sample of the different systems used to establish relationships with
stakeholders. After having reviewed all of the different types of stakeholder dialogue
activities, we can group them into the following categories:
•  Identifying, prioritizing and mapping key stakeholders for input into strategy
•  Establishing feedback mechanisms from stakeholders to the Board and senior
directors
•  Regular briefings and meetings in the form of stakeholder dialogue
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General sampleGraph 3. Engagement processes with stakeholders
Source: SAM Research.
Graph 3 shows that all four of these mechanisms are quite widespread among DJSI
sector leaders, but not among ordinary companies. The holding of regular meetings (e.g.,
stakeholder panels) is an almost universal practice, with 94% of companies (all but one)
indicating it as a regular procedure for engaging with stakeholders. Likewise, approximately
80% of DJSI sector leaders use the other three mechanisms mentioned above to interact with
stakeholders.
As we can see in Table 6, direct involvement of Board members in this dialogue
with stakeholders is common practice among DSJI leading companies. Nevertheless, only
informal processes can be considered a widespread procedure. Since we can assume that the
outcomes of formal processes of Board interaction with stakeholders have a greater impact
on Board decisions and firm strategy, it seems that this is an area that even leading
companies are only just starting to cultivate.
DuPont provides a good example of the strategic nature of Board level stakeholder
engagement. After a long process of stakeholder engagement, the company is changing to
new businesses. According to DuPont: “As we organize and grow our efforts to work with
external stakeholders with diverse viewpoints, areas of expertise and regional perspectives,
we find at least three areas for growth: climate/energy, food and nutrition, and safety and
security. All three address important global issues and all three require unprecedented
partnerships between the private and public sectors.” Because one of DuPont’s growth areas
(food and nutrition) requires the development of biotechnology-based products, DuPont has
created an independent Biotechnology Advisory Panel to guide the company’s actions in the
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the form of stakeholder dialogue
Feedback from stakeholders to
board and senior directors
Identification, prioritizing and
mapping of key stakeholders
Leaders
General sampleTable 6. Board interactions with stakeholders
Board’s strategy role
As we stated in the literature review, firms must change their strategies in order to
embed sustainable development dimensions; likewise, formulating strategy is one of the key
roles of Boards. As a result, one crucial role of top corporate governance bodies is to make
sure that SD/CR is a key variable embedded in the strategy formulation process. Graph 4
depicts different roles which are formally taken on by the Board of Directors. Once again
we can see how the biggest difference between DJSI leading companies and ordinary
companies lies in the field of CR.
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General sampleOnly 52% of the ordinary companies consider sustainable development a
responsibility of the Board of Directors, compared to a remarkable 94% (all but one) of the
DJSI leading companies. We can obtain an interesting insight by comparing the results from
this graph with the Board structure table. In Table 4 we found that only one sample
company did not have any kind of structure to integrate sustainability into strategy. This is
the same result that was found regarding the issue of ‘formal responsibilities of the Board of
Directors’. Therefore, we can infer that Board structure is a decisive factor for embedding
sustainability into the firm’s strategy. 
The way the Board of Directors ensures that sustainable development is integrated
as a key variable in the strategy formulation processes is totally dependent on the firm’s
governance structure. Therefore, in order to analyze this issue, we will distinguish among
the different structures of DJSI leading companies considered previously:
• Companies with Board CR committees. These committees play an active role in
providing input and assessing companies’ CR policies, objectives and practices.
They also inform Boards about company results on the sustainability front. The
CR committee is always supported and informed by top level corporate units. In
some cases, an executive team with corporate sustainable development
responsibilities interacts with the CR committee to formulate and review the
strategy and policies.
• Companies with existing committees taking on CR policies. This case is quite
similar to the previous one. However, because of the broader responsibilities of
this kind of committee, we cannot expect as much attention to be given to
sustainability issues as in a committee devoted exclusively to sustainability.
• Companies with one Board member responsible for social and environmental
policies.  In this case, corporate officers for environmental and social affairs
report to this director and keep him/her informed about the company’s results in
those areas.
Finally, we will mention some of the communication systems used by DJSI leading
companies to allow better interaction between the Board of Directors and management in
relation to sustainable development:
• Formal communication –through regular reports and/or shared membership–
from the top executive body to the Board of Directors on sustainable
development policies and performance. Some companies have gone a step
further and have created a specific executive committee –made up of members of
the executive management and top executives from each division– tasked with
formulating and supervising the implementation of sustainable strategies in
business units. In this case, corporate units and divisions support, provide input
to, and advise the top executive committee, which, in turn, informs the Board on
the company’s progress towards sustainability. Sustainability policies and
strategy are discussed in the interaction process between the Board of Directors
and management.
• Formal communication –through regular reports– from an internal sustainability
committee to the Board of Directors. This internal committee, which is the main
group responsible for implementing environmental, social and ethical initiatives,
is normally made up of CR directors and managers from support functions such
as Human Resources, Communications, Procurement, or Corporate Governance.
17Board’s service role
Most perspectives on corporate governance underline the importance of the service
role of the Board. Within the context of sustainable corporate governance, we expect that a
key Board activity in this role will be that of promoting core values. Values reflect beliefs
about what is truly important. For this reason, the acceptance of values tightly coupled with
the principles of sustainable development is essential for achieving real progress towards a
sustainable organization. In this section we discuss how the Boards, or any other department
on behalf of the Board, of DJSI leading companies play three roles related to the promotion
of core values. First, we will see different tools and policies used for internalizing the values
assumed by the company. Second, we will analyze different ways of checking the level of
awareness of values throughout the organization. Third, we will show how sustainability
leaders are extending their commitment to support sustainable development externally and
to other players in the value chain.
Internalizing values
Several mechanisms are in place to achieve the acknowledgment of corporate
values inherent in sustainable corporate governance, but a formal declaration of values and
principles in the form of a code of conduct is the most common mechanism used for this
purpose. All leading companies have a written statement of business practice to guide all
employees and managers in their day-to-day work. Generally, this document contains the
company’s values, vision statement –sometimes a sustainability mission statement– and a
code of business principles and conduct. It covers issues from obeying the law to displaying
integrity, as well as responsible and sustainable business practices (Graph 5 depicts the most
common issues covered by codes of conduct). The code of conduct always receives the
complete approval of the Board before its formal release and is handed out to all employees.
In Graph 5 we can observe how DJSI leading companies’ codes clearly address ethical,
social and environmental values and principles. The percentages are considerably smaller
for the general sample.
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Corruption and briberyThere are other tools to reinforce the understanding of the code of conduct or
corporate values related to sustainability. They include communication programs, training
programs for managers and employees, and dedicated help desks and procedures for solving
code of conduct concerns and doubts. The latter usually include open door policies, telephone
hotlines, confidential e-mail systems, ‘whistle blowing’ processes, or on-line tools. Less
frequent is the invitation to employees to offer their opinions on code of conduct reviews and
awards for outstanding ethical or environmental behaviors or practices. A summary of the
results follows:
•  All companies have a code of conduct for guiding employees’ and managers’
behavior in their day-to-day work.
•  Seventeen companies have communication policies to reinforce the understanding
of values and principles stated in the company’s code of conduct.
•  Fourteen companies have intranet programs to enhance understanding of the
code of conduct through practical examples and training sessions.
•  Thirteen companies link compliance with the code of conduct to employee
remuneration.
•  Eleven companies have help desks for solving code of conduct doubts.
•  Four companies invite employees to give their opinion in code of conduct or
ethical policy reviews.
•  Three companies offer awards for teams or individuals that demonstrate excellent
business practice in social, ethical or environmental behavior.
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Code of conduct implementationGraph 6 gathers these data and compares the implementation of some practices
among DJSI leading companies and the universe of firms analyzed by SAM. As we can see,
there are considerable differences between DJSI leading companies and ordinary companies.
The code of conduct is the most important tool for internalizing values. However, the use of
systems to internalize the code of conduct across the organization is much more developed
in DSJI leading companies than in ordinary companies. The difference in the degree of
implementation of these systems is over 30% on average. These are important results
because unless there are clear systems to implement the code of conduct, it has no impact on
management or employees’ behavior.
Checking the level of awareness of values
Whereas the code of conduct is a reserved power of, and is endorsed by, the
Board of Directors in DJSI leading companies, the implementation programs are
the responsibility of the business units or divisions. A senior manager in each business unit
is usually appointed to act as owner of the implementation programs. In addition, all
executives and managers must sign their knowledge of the code of conduct and their
commitment to promote it among employees. We also observed that some companies have
created a corporate compliance committee or have appointed a compliance officer to
oversee the policies and systems in place to ensure compliance with the code of conduct in
all divisions and business units. Senior managers or compliance committees report regularly
to the Board of Directors or Board audit committee and keep them informed of adherence to
business principles across the organization. Moreover, most companies apply disciplinary
procedures in the event of a breach of the code of conduct. It is also worth mentioning that
72% of the companies link employee and managerial pay to compliance with the code of
conduct as a way to ensure full awareness of business principles and values across the
organization. Also, 67% of the companies have made compliance with the code of conduct
an integral part of their employee performance appraisal system. The annual or bi-annual
employee surveys given to all employees are commonly used for measuring the level of
awareness of business principles and values. In addition, some of these companies have a
performance indicator for measuring the level of awareness of business principles among
employees. A smaller number of companies have gone a step further and are conducting a
Business Conduct and Ethics audit in all business units and subsidiaries. The results are
reported to the Board audit committee, which, in turn, informs the Board of Directors. A
summary of our findings follows:
• Seventeen companies have internal management systems and reporting structures
to ensure adherence to the principles and values endorsed in the code of conduct.
• Fourteen companies take disciplinary action in the event of a breach of the code
of conduct.
• Thirteen companies link the code of conduct to employee and manager
remuneration. 
•T welve companies have employee performance appraisal systems that take
account of compliance with the code of conduct. 
• Seven companies conduct internal Business Conduct and Ethics audits.
• Three companies track the progress of the level of awareness of business
principles and values among employees. 
20Graph 7 compares some of the code of conduct implementation procedures in the
DJSI leading companies and the universe of companies analyzed by SAM.
Graph 7. Implementation procedures of codes of conduct
Source: SAM Research.
As we can see in Graph 7, defining responsibilities and reporting lines is the most
common system for implementing the code of conduct, with 94% for DJSI leading
companies and 61% for ordinary companies. Comparing the results for these two groups
of companies, we see that DJSI leading companies are far more advanced than ordinary
companies. In some areas, such as linking compliance to employee remuneration, the
difference increases to more than 50%. The field of compliance system certification is
the only one where the results and the differences are not so significant. These findings
reaffirm the main idea that DJSI leading companies not only have declarations or statements
about the importance of embracing new values in accordance with sustainability, but also
have systems and procedures to ensure that all company members live up to those values.
Promoting values externally
The most extended and proactive way in which DJSI leading companies foster
corporate values externally is by assessing suppliers in accordance with social and
environmental criteria. The development of a ‘sustainable chain policy’ or ‘sustainable
supplier guidelines’ is discussed and endorsed by the Board of Directors or the Board CR
committee. Graph 8 shows the social and environmental areas taken into account in the
evaluation and selection of key suppliers. Environmental aspects and occupational health &
safety risks are the areas that receive the most attention. They are followed by labor
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and reporting lines are
systemically defined in all
divisions and group companiesleading companies, we find high percentages: 94% take environmental aspects into account
when selecting and evaluating key suppliers, and 89% consider occupational and health &
safety issues. These high percentages are consistent with the adoption of standardized
environmental management systems, as many organizations that have adopted these systems
display a preference for suppliers that are similarly certified. Compliance with labor
standards is also considered by 72% of the companies. A smaller percentage, 61%, includes
human rights in the evaluation. These results are especially important for companies
operating in developing countries, where institutional weakness, lack of regulations
and poverty leave employees in an extremely vulnerable position. To some extent, the
sustainable enterprise may face up to these deficiencies and promote good environmental,
social and ethical practices among its suppliers.
Graph 8. Areas considered in the evaluation and selection of key suppliers
Source: SAM Research.
We see impressive differences between DJSI leading companies and the rest. For
example, more than 50% of ordinary companies take only environmental aspects into
account. The percentages for labor concerns are even lower: only 40% of ordinary
companies take health & safety and labor standards into consideration when selecting and
evaluating suppliers, and only 25% care about human rights. Finally, 36% of the universe of
firms analyzed by SAM has no sustainability-related requirements when selecting and
evaluating suppliers. As several DJSI leading companies stated, developing a sustainable
chain policy is crucial for enhancing sustainability practices across the value chain. At the
same time, it allows the firm’s procurement department to assess and select suppliers
systematically and in accordance with sustainable development principles. We observe that
this policy can be complemented with other activities or policies aimed at achieving a higher
commitment from suppliers, for example: the application of some parts of the code of
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General sampleof dialogue channels and training programs to improve suppliers’ sustainable performance;
and the offering of rewards to suppliers that excel in social, ethical and environmental
business practices. Finally, the endorsement and support of international standards, such as
the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights6, is also used to exhibit to the
community the firm’s commitment to social, environmental and ethical values. This
decision is formally approved by the Board of Directors. Twelve of the DJSI leading
companies have endorsed an international standard.
Board’s monitoring role
In all the different perspectives on corporate governance, assessing firm
performance is a key role of the Board. In our analysis of DJSI leading companies we
focused on how these companies’ Boards evaluated their firms’ performance from a triple
bottom line perspective. Since the Balanced Scorecard (BSC) has become a standard tool
–in fact, all DJSI leading companies use the BSC as a strategic planning and management
tool– we analyzed to what extent leading companies have incorporated sustainability
objectives into their corporate BSC; that is to say, whether their BSC are Sustainable BSC.
As proposed in the sustainability literature, the Sustainable Balanced Scorecard (SBSC)
provides a broader vision by integrating all three dimensions of sustainability and so is
particularly suitable for value-based sustainability management (Figge et al., 2002).
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6 The most common standards supported by DJSI leaders are: United Nations Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, United Nations Global Compact, ILO Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, the
ILO Tripartite Declaration concerning Multinational Corporations and Social Policy, and other more specific
standards depending on the firm’s main business activity and location.Graph 9 offers the results regarding the different perspectives of the BSC
considered by companies. As we can see, the ‘traditional’ perspectives (customer, financial,
process and learning) have the biggest percentages, both in DJSI sector leaders and ordinary
companies. The inclusion of new perspectives is not yet a common practice. Only 50% of
DJSI sector leaders have included new perspectives, such as governance/stakeholder and
reputation. Nevertheless, some companies, instead of or in addition to adding a new
perspective, are considering sustainability in the traditional perspectives of the BSC.
Anyway, from the questionnaires we sent to DJSI leading companies, we conclude that the
adaptation of the BSC to sustainable development dimensions is still at an embryonic stage.
Most of the leading companies with a SBSC are just taking the first steps to transform their
BSC into a SBSC. It is interesting to gain some insight into how these companies are
developing, or want to develop, a SBSC. We observed three different ways of integrating
sustainability dimensions:
•  By integrating new social and environmental strategic objectives into the current
BSC perspectives. For instance, Dofasco has included environmental strategic
objectives in the ‘internal management’ perspective, whereas stakeholder
satisfaction (e.g., customers and workers) is included in the ‘customer’ and
‘people’ perspectives and monitored through satisfaction surveys. Similarly,
Novo Nordisk, has included new strategic objectives and has adapted some of its
BSC perspectives to reflect its commitment to addressing sustainability issues:
the ‘customer’ perspective has been transformed into the ‘customer & society’
perspective to include social, environmental and bioethical objectives.
• By  adding  new perspectives to the BSC to include sustainability objectives. For
example, Westpac Banking has included a fifth perspective, named the ‘corporate
responsibility’ perspective, which considers financial, customer, employee,
community, social and other general (reputation, sustainability and governance
ratings) sustainability measures. Some companies (e.g., DuPont or Marks &
Spencer) have added other perspectives related to sustainability dimensions, such
as ‘good governance’, ‘reputation’ or ‘community consent’.
•  By developing a specific scorecard for the social or environmental dimension.
This could be considered as a ‘second level’ scorecard that improves the
implementation of the sustainability objectives and helps a specific corporate
division to monitor its performance. For instance, 3M has set up an EHS
Scorecard that details critical eco-efficiency performance at 3M operations. The
EHS Scorecard reflects 3M’s ‘Environmental Targets 2005’ program, which sets
new five-year corporate environmental goals (e.g., improve energy efficiency,
reduce waste, etc.). These goals address environmental issues through eco-
efficiency and pollution prevention metrics. They are complemented by
individual business unit goals that incorporate product life cycle management
within the unit’s strategic plan.
In addition to the SBSC, we also analyzed other management systems that could be
used for deploying, assessing, and reviewing objectives in accordance with sustainability
policy. An interesting example is provided by Shell. In 1999, Shell developed the
Sustainable Development Management Framework (SDMF) to help raise awareness of
sustainable development across Shell companies and to embed its requirements into
decision-making (see Figure 2).
24Figure 2. Shell’s Sustainable Development Management Framework
Within this framework, Shell has developed a self-assessment tool to be used at
group, business or operating unit level. Its main purpose is to align business processes and
sustainable development: by integrating economic, social and environmental considerations
into decision making; by balancing short-term priorities and long-term needs; and by
engaging stakeholders. At the same time, it is intended to raise awareness and
understanding, stimulate dialogue, and lead to an action plan for systematic improvement of
sustainable development alignment. The self-assessment tool is comprised of six steps and a
series of short statements describing the degree of alignment at four levels –from minimal to
full alignment– for a number of business processes based on SDMF. 
Sustainable Corporate Governance Model
From our analysis of the corporate governance systems of DJSI leading companies
there emerges the Sustainable Corporate Governance Model. As we can see in Figure 3, in
order to contribute to a firm’s sustainable corporate performance, its governance system
should give appropriate answers to four key questions: who the Board’s members should be,
what their most important roles should be, how the Board should function so as to play































































performanceFigure 3. The Sustainable Corporate Governance Model
Why? Values. In accordance with the sustainability requirements, the proposals of
the sustainability literature and the insights obtained from our analysis of DJSI leading
companies, the single ultimate goal of business should not be to create shareholder value but
to endure, while at the same time enhancing the ability of the larger system to endure. This
will only be possible if the firm’s value foundations are coherent with this view of the firm.
Therefore, sustainability must be part of the nitty-gritty of corporate governance and must
permeate governance systems.
Who? Demographics. Since composition and characteristics are such closely
related attributes, we have merged them under the label “demographics”. One of the basic
points on which corporate governance scholars agree is that Board members must have the
necessary knowledge, experience, skills, network, etc. to carry out their duties. As we have
seen in our study of the governance systems of DJSI leading companies, their Board
members have a fine understanding of SD/CR requirements and challenges. The companies
achieve this by including experts on these topics in their Boards and, to a lesser extent, by
providing training to their directors.
How? Structure and Process. Most corporate governance codes propose the
establishment of Board committees –audit, appointment, etc.– and underline the importance
of Board working procedures. As we have seen in our research, DJSI leading companies
have adapted their Boards’ structure to tackle SD/CR issues and discuss them in their
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the strategyWhat? Resource, Service, Control and Strategy Roles. Resource dependence,
legalistic, agency theory and class hegemony perspectives on corporate governance propose,
to a greater or lesser extent, control, service, strategy and resource as the key roles of
governance systems. From our research on DJSI leading companies we have seen how these
roles acquire substance when SD/CR is embraced by their top corporate governance bodies.
As we can see in the Sustainable Corporate Governance Model, involvement in stakeholder
dialogue (resource role), promotion of core values (service role), embedding SD/CR within
strategy (strategy role), and evaluation of sustainable performance (control role) are the
specific tasks that governance systems should undertake to promote sustainable corporate
performance in firms.
Limitations and Implications
In this paper, drawing from the corporate governance, sustainable development, and
stakeholder theory literatures, and based on our own research on the corporate governance
systems of the 18 market sector leaders of the Dow Jones Sustainability World Index, we
have presented the Sustainable Corporate Governance Model. Aside from this contribution,
certain limitations of this study should be pointed out. 
First of all, this is a benchmark study that focuses on leading companies’ practices
to explore the future of corporate governance systems in relation to sustainability issues. We
would therefore like to emphasize that neither our study nor the emerging Model is intended
to represent the way in which the average firm is embracing sustainability in its governance
systems. Rather, the objective has been to shed some light on how sustainable governance
systems could take shape in the near future.
Also, although it is legitimate to state that our sample of companies represents
leading companies in the field of sustainability, this should not mask its limitations. The
18 companies we have analyzed in depth are the DJSWI market sector leaders. It is obvious
that circumstances differ between market sectors, and so companies in different sectors have
different experiences and sensitivities towards SD/CR. That is why we have found diverse
approaches and degrees of commitment to SD/CR, which adds to the richness of the study.
Finally, the proposal for a Model of Sustainable Corporate Governance is not an
attempt to question or replace previous recommendation and frameworks suggested in the
literature on corporate governance and codes of governance. As we have explained
throughout the paper, we have focused our analysis on governance practices related to
SD/CR, not on good governance in its broadest interpretation. Thus, the proposals for a
committee on SD/CR or for directors’ training on these issues do not imply that companies
should not set up compensation and appointment committees, nor train their directors in
accounting. On the contrary, the Model should be viewed as a way of integrating SD/CR
into the fabric of existing governance models.
As we stated in the introduction, this piece of research aims to bridge the existing
gap between the governance and SD/CR literatures. In pursuing this goal we have
uncovered a number of new and interesting questions. A few of the key questions are: What
is the most appropriate form of director involvement in stakeholder dialogue? Under what
circumstances should formal or informal relationships with stakeholders be favored? Is it
better to integrate SD/CR issues in existing BSC or to set up an SD/CR scorecard as a way
to highlight the issues’ importance? Based on what circumstances should a Board make its
choice between these two possibilities?
27Reputation seems to be the main reason for most companies to consider SD/CR
issues (World Economic Forum, 2004). Of course, reputation is a strategic asset and, as
such, should be carefully managed. Nevertheless, to advance towards sustainability, society
needs firms to adopt an approach towards SD/CR issues based more on innovation.
Innovation is a way to build more sustainable (in the double sense) competitive advantages.
Our analysis of DJSI leading companies, the best practices included in this paper, and the
Sustainable Corporate Governance Framework might be useful for companies that are aware
of the importance of sustainability and of their role in achieving it, and are trying to
incorporate SD/CR issues in their governance systems.
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